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Abstract
In this paper, we present the system description of the joint ef-
forts of Brno University of Technology (BUT) and Omilia –
Conversational Intelligence for the ASVSpoof2019 Spoofing
and Countermeasures Challenge. The primary submission for
Physical access (PA) is a fusion of two VGG networks, trained
on single and two-channels features. For Logical access (LA),
our primary system is a fusion of VGG and the recently in-
troduced SincNet architecture. The results on PA show that
the proposed networks yield very competitive performance in
all conditions and achieved 86 % relative improvement com-
pared to the official baseline. On the other hand, the results on
LA showed that although the proposed architecture and training
strategy performs very well on certain spoofing attacks, it fails
to generalize to certain attacks that are unseen during training.
1. Introduction
To facilitate better and safer customer support in e.g. banking
and call centers, there is a growing demand for convenient and
robust automatic authentication systems. Automatic speaker
verification (ASV) a.k.a. voice biometrics is arguably the most
natural and least intrusive authentication method in such ap-
plications. Unfortunately, ASV systems are vulnerable to syn-
thetic speech, created by text-to-speech (TTS) and voice conver-
sion (VC) methods, and to replay/presentation attacks [1]. The
attempts to deceive an ASV system by such methods are known
as ASV spoofing attacks. While research in ASV has been on-
going for several decades, it is only in the recent years that the
research community has started to tackle spoofing attacks sys-
tematically, through a series of ASV spoofing and countermea-
sures challenges [2, 3].
Spoofing attacks to ASV systems can be categorized into
4 types [1]. The first one is impersonation which can be re-
jected by an accurate ASV system [4]. The second and third
types are TTS and VC which were tackled in the ASVspoof
2015 challenge [2] and several methods have been proposed to
detect them [5, 6, 7, 8]. The last type of attacks is replay attack
with pre-recorded audio and it is considered to be the most dif-
ficult attack to detect [1]. Possible ways to tackle this problem
are (a) anti-spoofing techniques based on detecting typical dis-
tortions in recorded and replayed audio [3, 9], (b) using audio
fingerprinting [10] to detect a replay of an enrollment utterance,
and (c) using liveness detection and phrase verification [11] in
text-dependent speaker verification.
This paper presents the collaborative efforts of BUT and
Omilia to introduce novel countermeasures for the last three at-
tack types, as part of the 2019 automatic speaker verification
(ASV) anti-spoofing challenge. All our systems are based on
deep neural network (DNN) architectures, trained to discrimi-
nate between bonafide and synthetic or replayed speech and are
employed as end-to-end classifiers, i.e. without any external
backend. The physical access (PA) system is a fusion of two
VGG [12] networks using different features, while the logical
access (LA) system is a fusion of one VGG network and two
SincNet networks [13].
2. Physical access
2.1. Features and preprocessing
For this challenge we explore several features such as Mel-filter
bank, MFCC, constant Q-transform (CQT) [14], CQCC [15],
and power spectrogram. Among the explored features, power
spectrogram yields superior performance, followed by CQT
features. Accordingly, we use these two features in most of
our experiments. In particular, the submitted systems use ei-
ther the power spectrograms as a single input channel, or both
the power spectrograms and the CQT features fed as two differ-
ent input channels. As a feature preprocessing, both CQT and
power spectrogram are first transferred to log domain and then
subjected to mean and variance normalization (MVN) before
being fed to the network.
2.2. Example and minibatch generation for network train-
ing
The procedure for generating training examples and mini-
batches can greatly affect the performance of neural networks
in audio processing. Therefore, we experimented with several
different strategies for this. For example generation, we first
concatenate all features of the same class (same attack id) and
speaker. We then split the concatenated features into small seg-
ments of the same size. Initially we used four second segments
but after doing several experiments, we found that networks
trained on smaller segments performed better than those trained
on large segments, mainly because they overfit less to the train-
ing data. The size of the examples used to train the submitted
systems is one second (i.e. 100 frames).
For minibatch generation we experimented with different
strategies for distributing the examples into minibatches. We
found that the best strategy is to only use examples from a sin-
gle speaker within each minibatch (a few minibatches may con-
tain examples from more speakers in order to use all training
data). Each minibatch has 128 examples. After each epoch, we
randomise the examples and generate the minibatches again for
better generalization.
2.3. Training and development data
For training the networks, the official training set of the chal-
lenge was used. This set contains audio samples from 20 speak-
ers. One of the speakers was randomly selected for network
training validation set which is roughly 5 % of the training data.
The development set is also the official challenge’s devel-
opment set. This set which contains 20 speakers, was only used
for evaluating networks and comparing different methods and
training strategies.
2.4. Networks and training strategies
For this challenge, two different topologies were used for Phys-
ical access. The first one is a modified version of a VGG net-
work [12] which has shown good performance in Audio Tag-
ging and Audio Scene Classification [16, 17]. The second net-
work is a modified version of a Light CNN (LCCN) [18] which
had the best performance for ASVSpoof2017 challenge [9]. We
have used a modified version of both networks for acoustic
scene classification challenge 2019 [19]. In the following two
sections, both networks will be explained in more detail.
2.4.1. VGG-like network
The VGG network comprises several convolutional and pooling
layers followed by a statistics pooling and several dense layers
which perform classification. Table 1 provides a detailed de-
scription of the proposed VGG architecture. There are 6 con-
volutional blocks in the model, each containing 2 convolutional
layers and one max-pooling. Each max-pooling layer reduce
the size of frequency axis to half while only one of them reduces
the temporal resolution. After the convolutional layers, there is
a mean pooling layer which operates only on the time axis and
calculates the mean over time. After this layer, there is a flat-
ten layer which simply concatenates the 4 remaining frequency
channels. Finally there are 3 dense layers which perform the
classification task.
2.4.2. Light CNN (LCNN)
Table 2 shows the used LCNN topology for this challenge. This
network is a combination of convolutional and max-pooling lay-
ers and uses Max-Feature-Map (MFM) as non-linearity. MFM
is a layer which simply reduce the number of output channels
to the half by taking the maximum of two consecutive chan-
nels (or any other combination of two channels). The rest of
this network (statistics and classification parts) is identical to
the proposed VGG network.
2.5. Fusion and submitted systems
Since the evaluation protocol does not allow us to estimate fu-
sion parameters on the development set, we choose to use a
simple average with equal weight for our best systems. Our
submissions are the following:
• Primary: Fusion of two VGG networks. The first one
is trained using two-channels features while the second
one is fed with single channel log-power spectrogram.
• Single best: Our single best system for this part is the
VGG network with two-channels features.
• Contrastive 1: This system is a VGG network with sin-
gle channel log-power spectrogram features.
• Contrastive 2: The second contrastive system is LCNN
network again with single channel log-power spectro-
gram as features.
Table 1: The proposed VGG architecture. Conv2D: two dimen-
sional convolutional layer. MeanPooling: a layer which cal-
culate the mean in time axis and reduce the shape (remove the
time axis). Dense: fully connected dense layer.
Layer name Filter Output #Params
Input – 256 × 100 × 2 –
Conv2D-1-1 3 × 3 256 × 100 × 32 608
Conv2D-1-1 3 × 3 256 × 100 × 32 9.2K
MaxPooling-1 2 × 1 128 × 100 × 32 –
Conv2D-2-1 3 × 3 128 × 100 × 64 18.5K
Conv2D-2-2 3 × 3 128 × 100 × 64 37K
MaxPooling-2 2 × 1 64 × 100 × 64 –
Conv2D-3-1 3 × 3 64 × 100 × 128 74K
Conv2D-3-2 3 × 3 64 × 100 × 128 148K
MaxPooling-3 2 × 2 32 × 50 × 128 –
Conv2D-4-1 3 × 3 32 × 50 × 256 295K
Conv2D-4-2 3 × 3 32 × 50 × 256 590K
MaxPooling-4 2 × 1 16 × 50 × 256 –
Conv2D-5-1 3 × 3 16 × 50 × 256 590K
Conv2D-5-2 3 × 3 16 × 50 × 256 590K
MaxPooling-5 2 × 1 8 × 50 × 256 –
Conv2D-6-1 3 × 3 8 × 50 × 256 590K
Conv2D-6-2 3 × 3 8 × 50 × 256 590K
MaxPooling-6 2 × 1 4 × 50 × 256 –
MeanPooling – 4 × 256 –
Flatten – 1024 –
Dense1 – 512 525K
Dense2 – 512 263K
Dense3 (softmax) – 2 1K
Total – – 4321K
3. Logical access
3.1. Logical access using SincNet
SincNet is a novel end-to-end neural network architecture,
which receives raw waveforms as input rather than handcrafted
features such as spectrograms or CQCCs [13]. Contrary to other
end-to-end approaches, SincNet constrains the first 1D convo-
lutional layer to parametrized Sinc functions, encouraging it to
discover more meaningful (band-pass) filters. This architecture
offers a very efficient way to derive a customized filter bank
that is specifically tuned for the desired application. The fil-
ters are initialized using the Mel-frequency filter bank and their
low and high cutoff frequencies are adapted with standard back-
propagation as any other layer. SincNet is originally designed
for speech and speaker recognition tasks, and we believe it is a
good fit for the problem at hand, since certain artifacts created
by TTS and VC systems should be more easily detectable in the
waveform domain.
3.1.1. SincNet architecture
The first block consists of three convolutional layers. The
first layer performs Sinc-based convolutions, using 80 filters
of length L=251 samples. The remaining two layers using 60
filters of length 5. Next, three fully-connected layers com-
posed of 2048 neurons and normalized with batch normaliza-
tion were applied. All hidden layers use leaky-ReLU non-
linearities. Frame-level binary classification is performed by
applying a softmax classifier and cross-entropy criterion. We
use high dropout rates in all layers in one of our networks,
in order to improve its generalizability to unseen speakers and
Table 2: The proposed LCNN architecture. MFM: Max-
Feature-Map.
Layer name Filter Output #Params
Input – 256 × 100 × 2 –
Conv2D-1-1 5 × 5 256 × 100 × 32 1K
MFM-1-1 – 256 × 100 × 16 –
MaxPooling-1 2 × 1 128 × 100 × 16 –
Conv2D-2-1 1 × 1 128 × 100 × 32 544
MFM-2-1 – 128 × 100 × 16 –
Conv2D-2-2 3 × 3 128 × 100 × 64 10K
MFM-2-2 – 128 × 100 × 32 –
MaxPooling-2 2 × 1 64 × 100 × 32 –
Conv2D-3-1 1 × 1 64 × 100 × 64 74K
MFM-3-1 – 64 × 100 × 32 –
Conv2D-3-2 3 × 3 64 × 100 × 128 37K
MFM-3-2 – 64 × 100 × 64 –
MaxPooling-3 2 × 2 32 × 50 × 64 –
Conv2D-4-1 1 × 1 32 × 50 × 128 8K
MFM-4-1 – 32 × 50 × 64 –
Conv2D-4-2 3 × 3 32 × 50 × 256 148K
MFM-4-2 – 32 × 50 × 128 –
MaxPooling-4 2 × 1 16 × 50 × 128 –
Conv2D-5-1 1 × 1 16 × 50 × 256 33K
MFM-5-1 – 16 × 50 × 128 –
Conv2D-5-2 3 × 3 16 × 50 × 512 590K
MFM-5-2 – 16 × 50 × 256 –
MaxPooling-5 2 × 1 8 × 50 × 256 –
Conv2D-6-1 1 × 1 8 × 50 × 512 132K
MFM-6-1 – 8 × 50 × 256 –
Conv2D-6-2 3 × 3 8 × 50 × 512 1180K
MFM-6-2 – 8 × 50 × 256 –
MaxPooling-6 2 × 1 4 × 50 × 256 –
MeanPooling – 4 × 256 –
Flatten – 1024 –
Dense1 – 512 525K
Dense2 – 512 263K
Dense (softmax) – 2 1K
Total – – 2930K
spoofing attacks [13]. Our implementation is based on the open-
source PyTorch code provided by the authors 1.
3.1.2. Training and evaluating SincNet
SincNet is trained by randomly sampling 200 ms chunks from
each utterance, which are fed into the SincNet architecture.
Mean and variance normalization and energy-based voice ac-
tivity detector are applied in an utterance-level fashion. As in
the original SincNet we use RMSprop as optimizer, while we
train it with only 5 epochs, each comprising 1000 minibatches
of size 256. In the first epoch, we use a small learning rate,
which we increase and decrease again for the last epoch (namely
10
−5
, 10
−4
, 10
−3 and 10−4). The small learning rate in the
first epoch is chosen in order to preserve the mel-frequency
based initialization of the Sinc functions. This learning rate ap-
proach results to a steep decrease in the loss from the fourth
epoch. Moreover, during training we ensure that each mini-
batch used for back-propagation is balanced, such that for ev-
ery bonafide sample we randomly select a spoof sample from
the same speaker, resulting in 128 bonafide samples and 128
spoof samples for every minibatch.
During evaluation, utterance-level LLRs are derived by av-
eraging the corresponding frame-level LLRs, as estimated by
1https://github.com/mravanelli/SincNet
the logarithmic softmax layer.
3.1.3. Cross-validation over presentation attacks
In order to assess the generalizability of the network to novel
attacks, we first trained the network on a subset of attacks
and evaluated it on the remaining ones. By using this cross-
validation scheme, the EER attained on unseen attacks was al-
ways below 0.2% EER, underlying the good generalization ca-
pacity of the network, at least between those attacks included
in the training and development sets. Finally, we trained the
model on the whole training set using the best training strategy
defined by the cross-validation and we obtained 0.0 % EER (i.e.
no errors) on the full development set.
3.2. Logical access using VGG
For the Logical access we explored the two VGG architectures
that were the best for Physical access, i.e. the architecture de-
scribed in Table 1 with either log-power spectrum as a single in-
put channel, or with log-power-spectrum and CQT as two input
channels. Using only the log-power spectrum was substantially
better than using both features.
It is worth noting that we experimented with the SincNet
architecture on presentation attacks (i.e. PA), however its per-
formance was inferior to that of VGG.
3.3. Fusion and submitted systems
As in physical access we have 4 systems and again we fuse them
using simple averaging.
• Primary: Our primary system is fusion of a VGG net-
work with single channel log-power spectrogram fea-
tures and 2 SincNets which differ in the dropout rate.
• Single best: SincNet with the standard dropout rates.
• Contrastive 1: Fusion of two VGG network which were
trained using two channel and single channel features
like Physical access.
• Contrastive 2: SincNet with high dropout rates.
4. Experimental results
In this section, we report the official results evaluated by the
challenge organizers, based on the scores we submitted.
4.1. Results on Physical Access
Table 5 reports results attained by different submissions for
physical access. The first row of the table provides the results
for the organizers’ baseline which is a GMM based method with
CQCC features. The results on the evaluation set attained by
our submitted systems demonstrate their capacity in general-
izing very well to new PA configurations. By comparing the
single best and contrastive1 systems it is evident that the single
channel features perform considerably better on the evaluation
set (has better generalization).
A more analytic report can be found in Table 3. The first
letter in attack ID shows the environment definition. From A to
C, room size, room reverberation time and talker-to-ASV dis-
tance are increased and so, detection of A is more difficult than
C. The second letter of attack ID shows attack definition. From
A to C, attacker-to-talker distance is increased while replay de-
vice quality is decreased. Again, A is more difficult than C. It is
clear that the trends of the results are in line with expectations in
most cases (i.e. AA has the worst results and CC has the best.)
Table 3: Physical access detailed results based on min-tDCF for different conditions. The first section shows the baseline results and
the second section shows the primary and single best results of the best-performing systems, both from team T28.
Development set Evaluation set
System AA AB AC BA BB BC CA CB CC AA AB AC BA BB BC CA CB CC
CQCC-GMM 0.4928 0.0539 0.0213 0.3999 0.0360 0.0197 0.4338 0.0414 0.0149 0.4975 0.1751 0.0529 0.4658 0.1483 0.0433 0.5025 0.1360 0.0461
T28 Primary 0.0132 0.0030 0.0009 0.0073 0.0017 0.0009 0.0065 0.0023 0.0008 0.0190 0.0079 0.0034 0.0113 0.0083 0.0022 0.0127 0.0075 0.0024
T28 Single 0.0185 0.0044 0.0013 0.0146 0.0043 0.0014 0.0146 0.0081 0.0024 0.0251 0.0107 0.0055 0.0152 0.0114 0.0058 0.0183 0.0111 0.0063
Primary 0.0389 0.0062 0.0039 0.0243 0.0049 0.0048 0.0233 0.0073 0.0028 0.0776 0.0217 0.0091 0.0586 0.0223 0.0088 0.0557 0.0256 0.0110
Single best 0.0611 0.0046 0.0040 0.0404 0.0052 0.0053 0.0402 0.0085 0.0039 0.1061 0.0267 0.0117 0.0901 0.0277 0.0115 0.0843 0.0330 0.0128
Contrastive1 0.0523 0.0245 0.0151 0.0256 0.0156 0.0130 0.0280 0.0229 0.0135 0.0695 0.0383 0.0148 0.0493 0.0383 0.0141 0.0437 0.0394 0.0192
Contrastive2 0.0726 0.0323 0.0170 0.0562 0.0283 0.0153 0.0633 0.0353 0.0167 0.0969 0.0547 0.0187 0.0843 0.0519 0.0193 0.0842 0.0532 0.0229
Table 4: Logical access detailed results based on min-tDCF for different conditions. The first section shows the baseline results and
the second section shows the primary system results of the best performing team (T05) as well as the overall best single system results
(team T45). The bold numbers show conditions where our single system performs better or the same as the best single system.
Development set Evaluation set
System A01 A02 A03 A04 A05 A06 A07 A08 A09 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19
CQCC-GMM 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0261 0.0011 0.0000 0.0007 0.0060 0.4149 0.0020 0.1160 0.6729 0.2629 0.0344 0.0000 0.9820 0.2818 0.0014
T05 Primary 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0014 0.0000 0.0077 0.0055 0.0045 0.0028 0.0035 0.0050 0.0015 0.0341 0.0276 0.0020
T45 Single 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0036 0.0068 0.0085 0.0034 0.0308 0.0000 0.0130 0.0017 0.0058 0.0034 0.0042 0.0065 0.0071 0.9833 0.1171 0.0895
Primary 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0029 0.5672 0.0425 0.0425 0.1098 0.0005 0.5525 0.0000 0.3775 0.6473 0.0000
Single best 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.1393 0.9423 0.0426 1.0000 0.3693 0.0000 1.0000 0.0004 0.4764 0.6731 0.0000
Contrastive1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0654 0.2004 0.1663 0.5031 0.0002 0.9297 0.8583 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 0.0263 0.5749 0.3217
Contrastive2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0026 0.1505 0.9992 0.0253 1.0000 0.4737 0.0000 1.0000 0.0022 0.4131 0.9420 0.0009
Table 5: Physical access results of different submissions
Development set Evaluation set
System EER[%] min-tDCF EER [%] min-tDCF
CQCC-GMM 9.87 0.1953 11.04 0.2454
Primary 0.66 0.0170 1.51 0.0372
Single best 1.02 0.0254 2.11 0.0527
Contrastive1 1.07 0.0253 1.49 0.0401
Contrastive2 1.59 0.0401 2.31 0.0591
4.2. Results on Logical Access
We present here the results we attained on the evaluation test. In
Table 6 we report the results on the two sets. Clearly, although
our systems performed exceptionally well on the development
set, failed to generalize well to certain logical attacks unseen in
training.
The LA detailed results are reported in Table 4 based on dif-
ferent waveform generation methods include: neural waveform
(A01, A08, A10, A12, A15), vocoder (A02, A03, A07, A09,
A14, A18), waveform filtering (A05, A13, A17), spectral filter-
ing (A06, A19) and waveform concatenation (A04, A13, A16).
From the table, we observe that the attacks which degraded the
performance the most were A10, A12, and A15, which were all
based on neural waveform TTS systems. It is interesting to note
that for these attacks, the EER attained by SincNet was above
50 % (not reported here) while it performs better than or same as
the overall best single system in 12 conditions. The conclusion
is that the cross-validation method we performed was insuffi-
cient to prevent the network from overfitting and some more
analysis will be needed to figure out why the SincNet totally
failed for some waveform generation methods.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we presented the joint submission of BUT and
Omilia for the ASVspoof 2019. For PA, we followed the VGG
Table 6: Logical access results of different submissions
Development set Evaluation set
System EER[%] min-tDCF EER [%] min-tDCF
CQCC-GMM 0.43 0.0123 9.57 0.2366
Primary 0.00 0.0000 8.01 0.2080
Single best 0.00 0.0000 20.11 0.3563
Contrastive1 0.00 0.0000 10.52 0.2790
Contrastive2 0.03 0.0003 22.99 0.3811
architecture and obtained very competitive results in both devel-
opment and evaluation sets, by fusing only two networks. For
LA, we fused a VGG architecture with the recently proposed
SincNet. The rationale for employing the latter was its ability
to jointly optimize the networks and the feature extractor, which
was shown to be very effective for speech and speaker recog-
nition. Despite our efforts to prevent overfitting (mainly via
attack-level cross validation in training and development), the
results on LA showed the difficulty of the SincNet in generaliz-
ing to certain attacks which were significantly different to those
in the training. We conclude that more research is required in
order to make full use of end-to-end anti-spoofing architectures
such as SincNet in cases of large mismatch between training
and evaluation attacks.
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